Demand and equilibrium with inferior and Giffen behaviors by Le Van, Cuong & Pham, Ngoc-Sang
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Demand and equilibrium with inferior
and Giffen behaviors
Cuong Le Van and Ngoc-Sang Pham
IPAG Business School, CNRS, PSE, Montpellier Business School
12 March 2019
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/92709/
MPRA Paper No. 92709, posted 13 March 2019 14:40 UTC
Demand and equilibrium with inferior and Giffen
behaviors
Cuong Le Van∗
IPAG Business School, CNRS, PSE
Ngoc-Sang Pham†
Montpellier Business School
March 12, 2019
Abstract
We introduce a class of differentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave
utility functions exhibiting an explicit demand of a good which may have Giffen
behavior. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition (bases on prices and
consumers’ preferences and income) under which this good is normal, inferior or
Giffen good. Interestingly, with this utility, the equilibrium price of a good may
increase in the aggregate supply for this good.
JEL Classifications: D11, D50.
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1 Introduction
Inferior and Giffen goods have been mentioned in most microeconomics textbooks
(see Mas-Colell et al. (1995), Jehle and Reny (2011), Varian (2014) for instance).1
However, they are usually illustrated by pictures. In this paper, we present a class of
differentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave utility functions exhibiting an explicit
demand of a good which may have Giffen behavior. In our example, the consumption
set is R2+, and the demand function generated by our simple utility function has a
closed-form. Thanks to this tractability, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition
(based on prices and consumers’ preferences and income) under which this good is
normal, inferior or Giffen good. This helps us to analytically study income and prices
∗Email: Cuong.Le-Van@univ-paris1.fr. Address: CES-Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne – Maison
des Sciences Eco. 106-112 boulevard de l’Hoˆpital 75647 Paris Cedex 13, France.
†Emails: ns.pham@montpellier-bs.com, pns.pham@gmail.com. Address: 2300 Avenue des
Moulins, 34080 Montpellier, France.
1Jensen and Miller (2008) provide real evidences (in two provinces of China: Hunan and Gansu)
of Giffen behavior.
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effects. In particular, we show that the Giffen behavior arises when the price is not so
high and the consumer’s income is at the middle level. This is supported by empirical
evidences in Jensen and Miller (2008): when the price of a staple good increases, the
poor people responds by decreasing their demand of this good while the group in the
middle increases demand.
The second part of our paper focuses on the general equilibrium effects. Our utility
function leads to an interesting point in general equilibrium context: the price of a
good may be an increasing function of the aggregate supply of this good. Moreover,
we show that the Giffen behavior may arise in equilibrium when preferences or/and
endowments of agents change.
In the existing literature, several examples with Giffen behavior have been proposed.
However, in most of the cases, utility functions are piecewise-defined or demand func-
tions are not explicit or the consumption set is restricted. Heijman and von Mouche
(2012) provide a collection of papers studying Giffen goods, including the paper of Doi,
Iwasa, and Shimomura (2009).
Here, we just mention two recent papers (Haagsma, 2012; Biederman, 2015). Haagsma
(2012) presents a separable utility function generating Giffen behavior.2 In this ex-
ample, the consumption set is restricted (precisely, it is (γ1,∞) × [0, γ2) with γ1 >
0, γ2 > 0) and the utility function is quasi-concave but not concave. Moreover, in
Haagsma (2012), the good 1 demand c1 is always decreasing in the income, denoted by
w, whatever the prices and the consumer’s income. However, in our model, the sign
of ∂c1
∂w
depends on the prices and the consumer’s income. Recently, Biederman (2015)
provides a concave utility function3 and gives some numerical examples where Giffen
behavior arises. However, the demand function is not explicit. In our paper, we can
explicitly derive the demand function.
2 Individual demand
Assume that there are two goods and the consumption set is R2+. Given prices p1 > 0,
p2 > 0 and income w > 0, the consumer maximizes her utility U(c1, c2) subject to the
budget constraint p1c1 + p2c2 ≤ w. We will study how the demand c1 changes when
the consumer’s income w or/and price p1 change.
Assume that the solution is unique and interior, then it is determined by p1c1 +
p2c2 = w and the first order condition
U1
(
c1,
w−p1c1
p2
)
p1
=
U2
(
c1,
w−p1c1
p2
)
p2
(1)
where Ui(c1, c2) ≡ ∂U∂ci (c1, c2) for i = 1, 2. From this, we obtain the following result.
2The utility function is u(c1, c2) = α1ln(c1−γ1)−α2ln(γ2−c2) where 0 < α1 < α2 and γ1, γ2 > 0,
with the domain c1 > γ1 and 0 ≤ c2 < γ2.
3Biederman (2015) considers the following utility function
u(c1, c2) =
{
(c1+αc2)
1−σ
1−σ −Ae−βc1 for σ > 0, σ 6= 1
ln(c1 + αc2)−Ae−βc1 for σ = 0
.
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Lemma 1. Assume that U is strictly concave, strictly increasing and in C2. Assume
that (c1, c2) is an interior solution. Then, we have that:
∂c1
∂w
< 0 if and only if
p1
p2
U22(c1, c2)− U21(c1, c2) > 0 (2a)
∂c1
∂p1
> 0 if and only if
(p1
p2
U22(c1, c2)− U21(c1, c2)
)
c1 > U2(c1, c2). (2b)
Consequently, ∂c1
∂p1
> 0 implies ∂c1
∂w
< 0 (if good 1 is Giffen, then it must be inferior).
Proof. See Appendix A.1
We now introduce a class of utility function generating demand with Giffen behav-
ior. Suggesting by (2b), we choose a function such that U21/U22 is constant.
Proposition 1. We assume that
U(c1, c2) = c1 + bc2 + A
(ac1 + c2)
1−λ
1− λ (3)
where a, b, λ, A > 0, λ 6= 1, and ab 6= 1.4 This function is strictly increasing, strictly
concave and differentiable. The demand function for good 1 is given by
c1 =

0 if A(ap2 − p1) ≤ (bp1 − p2)
(
w
p2
)λ
p2
(
A
ap2−p1
bp1−p2
) 1
λ−w
ap2−p1 if (bp1 − p2)
(
w
p2
)λ
< A(ap2 − p1) < (bp1 − p2)
(
aw
p1
)λ
w
p1
if A(ap2 − p1) ≥ (bp1 − p2)
(
aw
p1
)λ
.
(4)
Moreover, the demand function is continuous.5
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
We now provide intuitions explaining the form (4) of the demand function. It is
easy to see that
A(ap2 − p1) ≤ (bp1 − p2)
(w
p2
)λ ⇔ a+ 1A( wp2 )λ
1 + b 1
A
(
w
p2
)λp2 ≤ p1 (5a)
A(ap2 − p1) ≥ (bp1 − p2)
(aw
p1
)λ ⇔ a+ 1A(awp1 )λ
1 + b 1
A
(
aw
p1
)λp2 ≥ p1 (5b)
Consider the function f(x) = a+x
1+bx
. We have f ′(x) = 1−ab
(1+bx)2
. By consequence,
min(a, 1/b) ≤ f(x) ≤ max(a, 1/b) ∀x ≥ 0. So, according to (5a), the consumer does not
buy good 1 if the relative price of good 1 is high (in the sense that p1/p2 ≥ max(a, 1/b)).
4Indeed, when ab = 1, maximizing this utility function is equivalent to maximizing the utility
function c1 + bc2, which does not correspond to our perspective.
5Moreover, the demand function is differentiable in (w, p1, p2, a, b, λ) except points satisfying
A(ap2 − p1) = (bp1 − p2)
(
w
p2
)λ
and A(ap2 − p1) = (bp1 − p2)
(
aw
p1
)λ
.
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According to condition (5b), the consumer does not buy good 2 if the relative price of
good 2 is high (in the sense that p2 min(a, 1/b) ≥ p1).
Under the second condition in (4), the solution is interior. Notice that, this condi-
tion implies that (ap2− p1)(bp1− p2) > 0, and so, the relative price has a middle level:
min(a, 1/b) ≤ p1/p2 ≤ max(a, 1/b). The second condition in (4) also requires that the
income w of the consumer must be bounded from below and above.
Proposition 1 allows us to identify conditions under which good 1 is normal, inferior
or Giffen.
Proposition 2. Let assumptions in Proposition 1 be satisfied. Consider the case of
interior solution.
1. Good 1 is normal (i.e., ∂c1/∂w > 0) if and only if ap2 < p1.
2. Good 1 is inferior (i.e., ∂c1/∂w < 0) if and only if ap2 > p1.
3. Good 1 has Giffen behavior (i.e., ∂c1/∂p1 > 0) if and only if
(bp1 − p2)
(w
p2
)λ
< A(ap2 − p1) < (bp1 − p2)
(aw
p1
)λ
(6a)
p2
(
A
ap2 − p1
bp1 − p2
) 1
λ
(
1− p2(ab− 1)
λ(bp1 − p2)
)
− w > 0. (6b)
Moreover, there exists a positive list (p1, p2, a, b, λ, A,w) such that (6b) and (6a)
hold.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
By combining Propositions 1 and 2, good 1 is normal if (1) the consumer only buys
this good (c1 = w/p1) or (2) the solution is interior (condition (6a) holds) and the
relative price is quite high (i.e., ap2 < p1). When the solution is interior, good 1 is
inferior if and only if the relative price p1/p2 is low
We now look at conditions under which Giffen behavior arises. Condition (6a)
is to ensure that the optimal allocation is interior while condition (6b) means that
∂c1/∂p1 > 0. Given a, b, p1, p2, A, w such that bp1 > p2 > w > p1/a, conditions (6a)
and (6b) are satisfied if λ is high enough; in addition, once (6a) is satisfied, condition
6b) tends to hold if w is low and/or A is high. For example, when p1 = 2, p2 = 2, w =
1.1, a = 2, b = 3, A = 3, λ = 6.
Proposition 2 allows us to understand the role of income in the existence of Giffen
behavior. Indeed, let us assume that bp1 > p2 > p1/a. According to (4), the consumer
only buys the good 1 if her income is very low; in this case, the good 1 consumption
is increasing in the income and the good 1 can be viewed as the most basic good
that the consumer can buy. Once the income exceeds a threshold w determined by
A(ap2 − p1) = (bp1 − p2)
(
aw
p1
)λ
but still lower the upper bound w¯ determined by
A(ap2 − p1) ≤ (bp1 − p2)
(
w¯
p2
)λ
, she buys both goods (interior solution). In this case,
the good 1 consumption is firstly decreasing in the income w if w ∈ (w,w∗), where w∗
such that the left hand side of (6b) is zero. By consequence, the Giffen behavior arises
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when the income is at the middle level. This property is supported by the empirical
evidences in Jensen and Miller (2008).
We end this section by providing some useful observations when finding utility
functions generating inferior goods as well as Giffen behavior.
1. Assume that the utility function is separable, i.e., U(c1, c2) = u(c1) + v(c2). If u
and u are concave, then c1 is increasing in income w. Indeed, we have U12 = 0.
So, Lemma 1 implies that: ∂c1
∂w
< 0 if and only if
p22
p21
u′′(c1)
v′′(c2)
+ 1 < 0. This cannot
happen because both u and v are concave.
However, If u or v is not concave, we can obtain inferior good and Giffen behavior.
Indeed, assume that the consumption set is R2+ and U(c1, c2) = Aln(c1) +
c22
2
. In
this case, one can prove that the demand for good 1 is
c1 =
{
w
p1
if w2 ≤ 4Ap22
w−
√
w2−4Ap22
2p1
if w2 > 4Ap22
(7)
So, the good 1 is normal if w2 ≤ 4Ap22. When w2 > 4Ap22, the good 1 is inferior
but not Giffen.
Haagsma (2012) considers a separable function u(c1, c2) = α1ln(c1−γ1)−α2ln(γ2−
c2) where the second term is convex in c2. In this case, he shows that Giffen be-
havior may arise. Note that the consumption set is (γ1,∞) × [0, γ2) which is
restricted.
2. We can also obtain Giffen behavior with simple utility functions by restricting
the consumption set in another way. Indeed, assume that U(c1, c2) = c1 + bc2
with b > 0 and the consumption set is {(c1, c2) ∈ R2+ : c1 + c2 ≥ 1}. c1 + c2 ≥ 1
is interpreted as survival condition. We can verify that: if p1 < p2 < bp1 and
w < p2, then c1 =
p2−w
p2−p1 which is increasing in price p1 and decreasing in income
w.
3. In the case of Leontief utility U(c1, c2) = min(u(c1), v(c2)) where u, v are in-
creasing, c1 is increasing in w. However, Sorensen (2007) considers the function
U(c1, c2) = min(u(c1, c2), v(c1, c2)) and show that this function may generate
Giffen behavior.
3 Equilibrium
We now look at equilibrium properties. We consider a pure exchange economy with
two goods. Assume that there are m agents with the same utility function U(c1, c2) =
c1 + bc2 + A
(ac1+c2)1−λ
1−λ , where a > 0, b > 0, λ > 0, λ 6= 1. The consumption set is R2+
and the endowments of agent i are wi1 > 0, w
i
2 > 0 for goods 1, 2, respectively.
We firstly investigate the equilibrium prices. The income of agent i is wi ≡ p1wi1 +
p2w
i
2. We focus on interior equilibrium: c
j
1 ∈ (0, wi/p1) ∀i. According to Proposition
1, we have that
(ap2 − p1)ci1 = p2
(
A
ap2 − p1
bp1 − p2
) 1
λ − wi. (8)
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From this and the market clearing condition
∑
i c
i
j =
∑
iw
i
j ∀j = 1, 2, we can
compute the relative price p¯1 ≡ p1/p2.
Proposition 3. Assume that ab 6= 1. If (wi1, wi2) is closed to (w1, w2) for any i,6 where
wj ≡
∑m
i=1w
i
j/m for j = 1, 2, then there exists an interior equilibrium with the relative
price
p1
p2
=
a+ (aw1+w2)
λ
A
1 + b (aw1+w2)
λ
A
. Moreover,
∂p¯1
∂b
< 0 <
∂p¯1
∂a
(9)
1. If ab > 1, then p1/p2 ∈ (1/b, a) and is decreasing in w1, w2 but increasing in A.
2. If ab < 1, then p1/p2 ∈ (a, 1/b) and is increasing in w1, w2 but decreasing in A.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
According to Proposition, our utility function (3) generates an interesting property:
the price of good 1 (resp., good 2) is increasing in its aggregate supply W1 ≡
∑
iw
i
1
(resp., W2 ≡
∑
iw
i
2) if ab < 1 (resp., ab > 1).
We now look at the demand for good 1 of agent i to understand when Giffen
behavior arises. According to (8) and (9), we can compute
ci1 =
aw1 + w2 − wi2 − p¯1wi1
a− p¯1 . (10)
By consequence, we have the following result.
Corollary 1. We have
∂ci1
∂p¯1
=
aw1 − awi1 + w2 − wi2
(a− p¯1)2 . (11)
This result leads to an interesting implication: the Giffen behavior arises when
preferences of agents change. Indeed, without the loss of generality, assume that ab > 1.
We also assume that agent i’s endowments are low in the sense that aw1+w2 > aw
i
1+w
i
2.
In this case, when A increases or b decreases, the relative price p¯1 increases. By
consequence, the demand for good 1 of this agent increases in the relative price p1/p2.
Notice that the Giffen behavior can also arise when agents’ endowments change.
Indeed, let us consider a simple case where there are identical agents and ab < 1. In
this case, ci1 = w1 ∀i and the relative price p1/p2 is increasing in w1. So, the good 1
consumption ci1 = w1 is increasing in p1/p2. In this case, the good 2 consumption is
decreasing in p2/p1.
6We require (wi1, w
i
2) to be closed to (w1, w2) to ensure that with the equilibrium price given by
(9), the optimal allocation is interior, i.e., cj1 ∈ (0, wi/p1) ∀i.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
The FOC can be rewritten as
p2U1
(
c1,
w − p1c1
p2
)
= p1U2
(
c1,
w − p1c1
p2
)
. (A.1)
By taking the derivatives of both sides of this equation with respect to w, we get that(
p2U11(c1, c2)− p1U12(c1, c2)
)∂c1
∂w
+ U12(c1, c2)
=
(
p1U21(c1, c2)− p
2
1
p2
U22(c1, c2)
)∂c1
∂w
+
p1
p2
U22(c1, c2)
which implies that(
p22U11(c1, c2)− 2p1p2U12(c1, c2) + p21U22(c1, c2)
)∂c1
∂w
= p1U22(c1, c2)− p2U12(c1, c2).
Since U is strictly concave, we have p22U11(c1, c2) − 2p1p2U12(c1, c2) + p21U22(c1, c2) < 0.
Therefore, we get (2a).
By taking the derivatives of both sides of (A.1) with respect to p1, we get(
p2U11
(
c1,
w−p1c1
p2
)
− p1U12
(
c1,
w−p1c1
p2
))
∂c1
∂p1
− c1U12(c1, w−p1c1p2 )
= U2(c1,
w−p1c1
p2
) + p1
(
U21(c1,
w−p1c1
p2
)− p1p2U22(c1,
w−p1c1
p2
)
)
∂c1
∂p1
− c1 p1p2U22(c1,
w−p1c1
p2
)
Consequently, we obtain
∂c1
∂p1
(
p2U11(c1, c2)− 2p1U12(c1, c2) + p
2
1
p2
U22(c1, c2)
)
= U2(c1, c2) + c1U12(c1, c2)− c1 p1p2U22(c1, c2).
which implies (2b).
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
The budget constraint must be binding: p1c1 + p2c2 = w. Since the feasible set is convex,
concave and the function U is strictly concave and strictly increasing, there exists a unique
solution. We write FOCs
U1(c1, c2) + λ1 = p1µ, λ1 ≥ 0, λ1c1 = 0 (A.2a)
U2(c1, c2) + λ2 = p2µ, λ2 ≥ 0, λ2c2 = 0. (A.2b)
We have U1(c1, c2) = 1 + aA(ac1 + c2)
−λ and U2(c1, c2) = b+A(ac1 + c2)−λ.
We consider different cases.
1. c1 = 0, c2 = w/p2. In this case, λ2 = 0 and then
U2(c1,c2)
p2
= µ ≥ U1(c1,c2)p1 . This means
that
p2
(
1 + aA(ac1 + c2)
−λ
)
≤ p1(b+A(ac1 + c2)−λ)⇔ (w
p2
)−λ(ap2 − p1)A ≤ bp1 − p2
⇔ A(ap2 − p1) ≤
(
bp1 − p2
)(w
p2
)λ
.
It is easy to verify that: this condition holds if and only if (c1, c2) = (0, w/p2).
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2. c1 = w/p1, c2 = 0. In this case, λ1 = 0 and then
U2(c1,c2)
p2
≤ µ = U1(c1,c2)p1 . This means
that
p2
(
1 + aA(ac1 + c2)
−λ
)
≥ p1(b+A(ac1 + c2)−λ)⇔ (aw
p1
)−λ(ap2 − p1)A ≥ bp1 − p2
⇔ A(ap2 − p1) ≥
(
bp1 − p2
)(aw
p1
)λ
It is easy to verify that: this condition holds if and only if (c1, c2) = (w/p1, 0).
3. Let us consider an interior solution 0 < c1 < w/p1. We will prove that this is the case
if and only if condition (6a) hold, i.e.,
(bp1 − p2)
(w
p2
)λ
< A(ap2 − p1) < (bp1 − p2)
(aw
p1
)λ
. (A.3)
The FOC becomes U1p1 =
U2
p2
, or equivalent
p2
(
1 + aA(ac1 + c2)
−λ
)
= p1(b+A(ac1 + c2)
−λ)
⇔ A(ap2 − p1) =
(
bp1 − p2
)((ap2 − p1)c1 + w
p2
)λ
(A.4)
Since ab 6= 1, we have ap2 − p1 6= 0 and bp1 − p2 6= 0. So, the equation (A.4) has a
unique solution (because λ > 0).
(a) Case 1: ap2 − p1 > 0 which implies that bp1 − p2 > 0. The above equation has a
unique solution c1 in (0, w/p1) if and only if (A.3) holds.
(b) Case 2: ap2 − p1 < 0 which implies that bp1 − p2 < 0. The right hand side is
an increasing function of c1. So, the equation (A.4) has a unique solution c1 in
(0, w/p1) if and only if (A.3) holds.
Summing up, the equation (A.4) has a unique solution c1 in (0, w/p1) if and only if
(A.3) holds. In such case, we find that(
A
ap2 − p1
bp1 − p2
) 1
λ
=
(ap2 − p1)c1 + w
p2
⇔ (ap2 − p1)c1 = p2
(
A
ap2 − p1
bp1 − p2
) 1
λ − w. (A.5)
We now prove the continuity of the demand function. Observe that the utility function
is continuous and the budget correspondence
B(p1, p2) ≡ {(c1, c2) ∈ R2+ : p1c1 + p2c2 ≤ w}
is continuous. From the maximum theorem, the demand correspondence is upper semi con-
tinuous. Since we have proven above that it is single valued, it is in fact a continuous
function.
We can also prove the continuity of the demand function by using the following properties
lim
A(ap2−p1)−(bp1−p2)( wp2 )
λ→0
p2
(
Aap2−p1bp1−p2
) 1
λ − w
ap2 − p1 = 0,
lim
A(ap2−p1)−(bp1−p2)(awp1 )
λ→0
p2
(
Aap2−p1bp1−p2
) 1
λ − w
ap2 − p1 =
w
p1
.
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Points 1 and 2 are obvious. We now look at the Giffen behavior. We have
c1 =
1
ap2 − p1
(
p2
(
A
ap2 − p1
bp1 − p2
) 1
λ − w
)
∂c1
∂p1
=
1
(ap2 − p1)2
(
p2
(
A
ap2 − p1
bp1 − p2
) 1
λ − w
)
+
A
1
λ p2
ap2 − p1
1
λ
(ap2 − p1
bp1 − p2
) 1
λ
−1 p2(1− ab)
(bp1 − p2)2 .
Therefore, we get that
(ap2 − p1)2 ∂c1
∂p1
= p2
(
A
ap2 − p1
bp1 − p2
) 1
λ
+
(
A
ap2 − p1
bp1 − p2
) 1
λ 1
λ
p22(1− ab)
bp1 − p2 − w (A.6)
which implies point 3. We now prove that there exists a positive list (p1, p2, a, b, λ, w,A) such
that (6b) and (6a) hold, i.e., ∂c1∂p1 > 0. It suffices to prove that there exists a positive list
(p1, p2, a, b, λ, w,A) such that the following conditions are satisfied
1
ap2 − p1
(
p2
(
A
ap2 − p1
bp1 − p2
) 1
λ − w
)
∈ (0, w/p1) (A.7)
ap2 − p1 > 0, bp1 − p2 > 0 (A.8)
p2
(
A
ap2 − p1
bp1 − p2
) 1
λ
+
(
A
ap2 − p1
bp1 − p2
) 1
λ 1
λ
p22(1− ab)
bp1 − p2 − w > 0. (A.9)
Indeed, let ap2 − p1 > 0, bp1 − p2 > 0 and Ap2 > w > Ap1a . These conditions imply that
0 < Ap2−wap2−p1 <
w
p1
. When λ→∞, we have
1
ap2 − p1
(
p2
(
A
ap2 − p1
bp1 − p2
) 1
λ − w
)
−→ p2 − w
ap2 − p1 ∈
(
0,
w
p1
)
(A.10)
p2
(
A
ap2 − p1
bp1 − p2
) 1
λ
+
(
A
ap2 − p1
bp1 − p2
) 1
λ 1
λ
p22(1− ab)
bp1 − p2 − w −→ Ap2 − w > 0. (A.11)
So, the above conditions are satisfied.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
We have proved that if equilibrium is interior, the relative price must be
p1
p2
=
a+ (aw1+w2)
λ
A
1 + b (aw1+w2)
λ
A
. (A.12)
We have to now prove that with this price, the allocation (ci, ci2) given by
(ap2 − p1)ci1 = p2
(
A
ap2 − p1
bp1 − p2
) 1
λ − wi, p1ci1 + p2ci2 = p1wi1 + p2wi2 (A.13)
is optimal for the agent i. To do so, it suffices to check the following condition (we apply
Proposition 1), (
bp1 − p2
)(wi
p2
)λ
< A(ap2 − p1) <
(
bp1 − p2
)(awi
p1
)λ
. (A.14)
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If this condition is satisfied for the case where wij = wj with j = 1, 2, then so is for the
case where (wi1, w
i
2) is enough closed to (w1, w2) for any i.
We now prove this condition when wij = wj with j = 1, 2. We present a proof for the case
ab > 1. The case ab < 1 is similar. Suppose ab > 1. Consider the function f(x) = a+x1+bx . We
have f ′(x) = 1−ab
(1+bx)2
< 0. Condition a > 1/b implies that p1p2 =
a+
(aw1+w2)
λ
A
1+b
(aw1+w2)
λ
A
∈ (1b , a). Since
ab > 1, condition (A.14) is equivalent tobp1 − p2 > 0, ap2 − p1 > 0( w
p2
)λ
< Aap2−p1bp1−p2 <
(
aw
p1
)λ ⇔ {bp1 − p2 > 0, ap2 − p1 > 0p1w1+p2w2
p2
< aw1 + w2 <
a(p1w1+p2w2)
p1
(A.15)
⇔
{
bp1 − p2 > 0, ap2 − p1 > 0
p1
p2
< a
⇔ 1
b
<
p1
p2
< a (A.16)
It means that condition (A.14) is satisfied.
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